What do the recent trends in German economic development convey about the trajectory of change? Has liberalization prepared the German economy to deal with new challenges? What effects will liberalization have on the coordinating capacities of economic institutions? This paper argues that coordination and liberalization are two sides of the same coin in the process of corporate restructuring in the face of economic shocks. Firms seek labour cooperation in the face of tighter competitive pressures and exploit institutional advantages of coordination. However, tighter cooperation with core workers sharpened insider-outsider divisions and were built upon service sector cost cutting through liberalization. The combination of plantlevel restructuring and social policy change forms a trajectory of institutional adjustment of forming complementary economic segments which work under different rules. The process is driven by producer coalitions of export-oriented firms and core workers' representatives rather than by firms per se.
Since the rapid changes in non-liberal market economies of the mid-1990s
doubts have emerged about the distinctiveness of the Varieties of Capitalism literature (VoC) as a useful conceptual paradigm (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) .
There were those who assumed that globalization -in the sense of market expansion, technological diffusion and closer integration -would sooner or later lead to a convergence of political economies. Institutional distinctions were merely seen as relicts from previous stages of economic development which were to be discarded in due course.
Among the more fine-tuned observers, globalization was seen as having an ambivalent effect on coordinated market economies. On the one hand, further opening national economies to international trade reinforces economic specialization, thereby making countries more dependent on their comparative economic advantages, and leads to further protection of institutional advantages by firms and economic interest organizations (Franzese and Mosher, 2001; Thelen and van Wjinbergen, 2003; Wood, 2001) . On the other hand, increasing financial internationalization might lead to the opposite effect. The rise of global investors and impatient capital even in countries with protected corporate finance would eventually lead to higher performance expectations and an increase in shareholder value expectations in firms of coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Höpner, 2001 ).
In addition, challenges to non-liberal institutions came from other sources. Cross-country comparisons show that coordinated market economies today are less egalitarian than before, increasingly divergent, and their institutions less encompassing. They remain different from liberal market economies in the following ways: capital markets remain underdeveloped, labour markets are more regulated, pay setting is still coordinated, trade unions remain much stronger and social spending generally higher. Recent discussions about the 'commonalities' of capitalism rather than differences focussing on dynamic trends across all market economies, indicate a departure from the allpervasive theoretical assumptions of the comparative capitalism literature (Streeck, 2010 An analysis of the German political economy's transformation since reunification shows economic shocks have driven plant-level actors to pursue radical cost cutting and productivity increases by exploiting existing patterns of plant-level cooperation. Intensified plant-level cooperation led to employment guarantees for core workers which insulated them from previous demands for strong social security provisions. In turn, persistent outsourcing to low cost countries and low cost service sectors has added to liberalization in other parts of the economy, particularly through the use of fringe workers. Manufacturing firms, with the tacit support of their works councils, supported firms in service industries that lobbied for more liberal employment rules for non-core segments of the workforce. When the German government pursued activation strategies on the labour market, core firms and core workers did not veto the proposed measure of liberalization.
Thus, sustained economic coordination has facilitated, and to some extent required, liberalization in some areas for cost containment, more flexible corporate finance and numerical flexibility of the workforce. As a consequence of the benefits of coordination, firms actively pursued a strategy of separation of the workforce, which divided employees into core and fringe workers. Liberalization did not occur despite strong resistance by key beneficiaries of social policy, but rather was accepted and supported as a precondition for sustained coordination. (Amable, 2003; Crouch and Streeck, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001) . Many scholars' analyses of institutional configurations in national political economies strongly emphasised the interdependence between the mode of corporate finance and the innovation and usage of human resources within firms competing in international markets. They concluded non-liberal forms of market economies displayed a number of starkly contrasting features to liberal Anglo-American countries, such as concentrated ownership of firms through block-holding, bank-finance, plantlevel cooperation between workers and managers, higher levels and more specific skills in core industries and pathways of specialization in different technologies and industries.
Some level of disagreement on the foundations and origins of diverse economic institutions has always prevailed. Different perspectives emphasised micro versus macro level approaches, the use of rational choice assumptions and large n-comparisons with few historical case studies. In particular, approaches focusing on the firm's role as a micro-level actor espousing rationally based preferences and assuming institutional equilibria were in contrast to macro-level studies of institutions emphasizing power resource (PR) approaches in historically unique settings over long periods of time. PR approaches perceived non-liberal economic institutions as a result of the rise of left of centre political parties in cooperation with strong trade unions. These coalitions pushed for economic institutions at distinct historical turning points when business was bound (Korpi, 2006) . In contrast, VoC approaches in a rational choice tradition (VoC-RC) see the evolution of economic institutions as a self-reinforcing process of firms' quest for conquering market niches, innovation and productivity. All the while, the commonalities in the discussions tended to be greater than the criticism of their assumptions.
However, since the mid-1990s, advanced political economies have started to display rather strong evidence of institutional change, particularly in continental European non-liberal market economies. Most countries'
governments have implemented reforms of labour market policy (Bonoli, 2010) , unemployment insurance (Clegg, 2007) and pensions (Häusermann, 2010) , altering the patterns, if not scale, of social spending and the social security position of workers. Labour market regulation was weakened for labour market outsiders by facilitating temporary work, while many regulations were kept for labour market insiders. VoC literature has underlined how the protection of specific skills, inherent to the generous and far reaching status-securing unemployment benefit systems and strong employment protection, helped workers to invest in specific skills (EstevezAbe et al., 2001) . Government tended to dismantle these provisions when they started to address low labour market participation rates and rising long-term unemployment.
Capital markets and corporate governance regulations have been the subject of intense reform pressure. Beginning in the mid-1990s, many governments liberalized capital markets towards liberal market economies (Culpepper, 2010) . In some cases, reform was radical and far-reaching, while in others, reform steps were less radical and incremental. Corporate finance shifted slightly towards equity finance, and some large national champions defined themselves as shareholder value firms similar to their Anglo-American counterparts.
Structural changes to the labour market towards deindustrialization and labour market deregulation also weakened the position of trade unions.
Union membership figures declined substantially across almost all industrialized countries. Employers' associations lost members, collective bargaining coverage declined, and collective bargaining practices changed.
While centralized collective bargaining survived in most places, the contents of collective agreements were less regulated than before and delegated more decision making rights to a lower level.
Plant-based vocational training, another prominent feature of non-liberal capitalism, declined and a steady trend towards higher and tertiary education lured school leavers away from mid-level specific skills. In other words, the fundamental institutions non-liberal market economies were meant to rest changed profoundly in the direction of increasing liberalization and deregulation (Streeck, 2009) .
The literature provides different approaches to the causes, mechanisms and effects of these changes. Earlier contributions pointed out the effects of globalization as a liberalizing force because it increases the likelihood of concession bargaining through firms' better exit alternatives. However, as Thelen and van Wijnbergen (2005) have demonstrated, though globalization increases the vulnerability of export oriented firms, their dependence on labour has grown rather than decreased. The effects of capital market liberalization and the rise of shareholder value on the behaviour of large firms has indicated a trend towards more liberal practices, in particular off-shoring and outsourcing (Beyer and Hassel, 2002) .
On the whole, the discussion moved towards previously unresolved issues, such as the role of the state in modern market economies (Rhodes and Molinas, 2007) , the role of political power relations and the economic and political preferences of firms towards constraining regulations. These factors became increasingly important for explaining institutional change (Hancke et al., 2007) .
As the transformation of CMEs accelerated, the underlying conflict in the literature between PR approaches and VoC-RC approaches reappeared. PR perspectives would see a shift towards liberalization as a strategy pursued by business as a matter of principle to diminish the effects of constraining regulation and trade union demands for redistribution and restricted practices. Liberalization would be made possible by shifts in partisanship of governments and coalitions between business and governing parties at the expense of labour.
In contrast, authors using the VoC-RC approach would expect trends towards liberalization arising from conflicting preferences within the business community, such as financial market actors versus manufacturing firms.
Financial market actors in non-liberal systems seeking new sources of corporate finance would pressure management for more short-term profits and therefore faster turn-over of staff and production cycles. They would expect much less drive towards liberalization within non-liberal market economies, as long as business interests were well served by existing institutions (Wood, 2001) . In the following, I will use an analysis of the transformation of the German political economy over the last two decades as an illustration and evidence for the importance of the notion of producer coalitions as driving and shaping policy and institutional change.
German economy devalued its real unit labour costs in relation to its
European competitors by 20 percent (Marin, 2010a) .
Throughout the 2000s, real unit labour costs rose slower than Germany's major competitors, including the Eurozone as a whole (Graph 1). Cost cutting was achieved through a combination of plant-level restructuring and policy change, which helped to reduce costs and increase productivity without hurting the skill base and flexibility of the manufacturing workforce.
Off-shoring, particularly to Eastern Europe, took off in the second half of the 1990s (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2009 ). Some observers suggested organizing production by slicing up the value chain "has been more important for Germany's lower unit labour costs than German workers' wage restraint" (Marin, 2010b) . According to estimates, German off-shoring to Eastern Europe boosted both the productivity of its subsidiaries in Eastern
Europe almost threefold compared to local firms and increased the productivity of German based parent companies by more than 20 percent. 3
In any case relocating production to Eastern Europe made globally competing German firms leaner and more efficient helping them to win market shares in a growingly competitive world market. The efficiency gains from reorganising production were particularly pronounced after 2004 leading to a sharp fall in Germany's relative unit labour costs from 2004 to 2008 (Marin, 2010b) .
Marin suggests that off-shoring to Eastern Europe has also led to lower wages for skilled workers in Germany:
German firms off-shored the skill intensive part of the value chain to exploit the low cost skilled labour available in Eastern Europe. As a result, the demand for this type of labour in Germany was lower, putting downward pressure on skilled wages in Germany. Hence, offshoring improved Germany's competitiveness by increasing German firms' productivity and by lowering its skilled wages (Marin, 2010b) .
In order to restructure manufacturing plants without facing trade union opposition, management and works councils used the plant-level concession bargaining tool, often coined 'employment pacts', introduced by DaimlerBenz in the late 1980s. They settled agreements aimed at improving the competitiveness of plant, which led to more secure jobs. Both sides compromised: workers accepted pay cuts, longer working time and more flexible working patterns, while management guaranteed investments and promised not to resort to mass redundancies (Hassel and Rehder, 1999; Massa-Wirth and Seifert, 2004; Rehder, 2003; Seifert, 2002) .
Source: OECD
In comparison to concession bargaining in the US, these agreements were broader and less one-sided. They included measures to improve the infrastructure, training, costs and productivity as well as technology. The workforces of particular plants were rated in benchmarking comparisons and collaborated with local management to make the most profitable bid for investments. Promises by management were not legally binding, but had a reputation for day to day relations with works councils.
One important component of concession bargaining was the increasing gap between core and peripheral workers through the out-sourcing process.
Collective agreements were adjusted accordingly, in particular by transferring service components into other collective agreements and lower pay. Canteens, security and other service components were removed from manufacturing This strategy worked with union cooperation. Unions rarely blocked workplace deals aimed at providing job security and competitiveness, and did not often talk about the deals to avoid other firms from following suit.
Protection for the workforce core and the instability for fringe workers (the insider-outsider problem) were complementary to each other. Firms argued the only way to protect core workers was to look for other ways to lower labour costs -at the expense of other parts of the workforce. Flexibility was therefore achieved in an uneven pattern.
Union weakness was expressed in rapidly falling union membership rates (Hassel, 2008) and the failure to rally enough support for industrial action. Both marginal employment and fixed-term contracts are overwhelmingly used by employers in service industries. Only about 10 percent of marginal employment is in manufacturing, while more than 80 percent are service sector jobs (Minijobzentrale, 2010) . The prevalence of fix-term contracts varies across sectors with more than 20 percent in the service sector and less than 7 percent in manufacturing (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2010) . This reflects the demand for non-standard employment in different industries. While manufacturing industries also benefited from the change in policy, service industries depended on them. In particular, part-time and marginal employment was a key policy instrument used to cut service costs.
4 With regard to further regulatory changes, the regulation of fixed term employment has been loosened drastically. Using the OECD scale of 0 to 4, regulatory tightness of fixed term employment was relaxed from 3.5 in 1990 to 0.75 in 2008. Similarly, agency work underwent massive deregulation from 4.0 to 1.75. At the same time, permanent employment was more strictly regulated from 2.58 to 3.0.
However, the main catalyst for cost cutting was the change in labour market policy in 2003. While initially driven by the need to curb public spending, activation policies turned out to be a major programme for subsidizing low skilled employment. Fiscal constraints were the key facilitators for policy change Schiller, 2009, 2010) . introduced major in-work benefits for part-time and low paid employees.
Since all transfer recipients are required to take any job offered to them to prove their willingness to work, and since no statutory minimum wage has been set, wages can be set at extremely low levels and be topped up by transfer payments. About 28 percent of long-term unemployed benefit recipients are employed in work and receive benefits at the same time. In June 2010 this group amounted to 1.4 million employees. 6
At the same time, benefit system reforms have not altered the high-tax wedge that burdens low skilled low paid work, an obstacle towards a more employment friendly system. Germany remains the OECD country with the highest marginal tax rate for low paid employment. Social security contributions are set at a proportional rate and kick in at a comparatively low threshold. The reason for non-progressive social security rates is primarily due to the insurance-based welfare state, which draws on employers and employee contributions equally. This is also partly the reason for the high number of marginal jobs described above. While marginal employment is exempted from contributions, full-time employment for low paid workers is taxed at a rate of 36 percent (Immervoll, 2007) . The strong pressure on unemployed to take up low paid employment and a new system of topping up income with partial benefits create strong incentives for low skilled workers to take up part-time employment for very low wages and simultaneously draw social security benefits.
As a result of policy change, the trend of declining male employment rates, compared to marginal employment are significantly higher than in previous economic upswings (Koch et al., 2009, p. 236) . Long-term unemployment also decreased faster than in previous periods of economic recovery (Gartner and Klinger, 2008, p. 442 The initial pay rate for agency work is 7 Euro and therefore below the rate unions want to see as a minimum wage (Vanselow, 2009, p. 3) .
Survey data show that the unemployed are increasingly willing to take jobs below their skill levels, for lower pay and with worse terms and conditions.
Those employed are also more willing to accept concessions in exchange for job security (Kettner and Rebien 2009, pp. 6-7) .
The downside of the labour market activation is the rapid increase of low pay.
Since the mid-1990s, low pay has been constantly rising. shares of low pay employment than Germany (Bosch and Kalina, 2007, p. 27 ).
The share of low paid has since increased and was only topped in 2005 by the US (Carlin and Soskice, 2009, p. 77) . Low pay is not confined to the unskilled; the share of low paid skilled workers rose from 58.5 percent in 1995 to 70.8 percent in 2007 (Kalina and Weinkopf 2009, p. 6 ). Low pay is gradually diffusing into the core of the labour market; whereas it used to be concentrated in atypical work, it is now found in full and part-time employment and standard jobs. The majority of those low paid are women, though the share of men is rising. In terms of quantity, marginal employment has been the most important form of irregular employment. In 2007, marginal employment accounted for 7 million employees, with the highest concentration in retail (Minijobzentrale, 2010) .
Fixed term employment has increased significantly over the last two decades.
In 2008, about 2.7 million of the 30.07 million employees were on a fixed term contract, which accounted for a share of 5.7 percent (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2009 ). This number excludes trainees and students. Temping agency work also increased rapidly. In 2009, 1.6 percent of all employees worked for temping agencies, an increase of 53 percent over 2 years (Eichhorst, 2010) . In total, however, fixed term employment and workers employed by temping agencies still account for less than 10 percent of the workforce (Eichhorst and Marx, 2009, p. 14) .
The increase of irregular and marginal employment must be seen in the context of firms' attempts to increase or maintain job security for core workers. As in many southern and eastern European countries, governments, employers and unions jointly preferred the deregulation of the peripheral labour market over the deregulation/liberalization of employment protection for the core workforce. As a consequence, the dualism of insiders and outsiders on the labour market has deepened, regarding both the number of workers affected and the degree of regulatory differences.
Overall, the experience is therefore mixed. More employment is combined with low pay and insecure employment. Studies have shown that low paid employment does not usually serve as a path to better paid work. In a survey of 30,000 low paid full-time workers in 1998/99, only 13 percent managed to find better work by 2005 (Koch et al., 2009, pp. 249-250) .
Activating the long-term unemployed has therefore not solved the structural problems of the German labour market. Germany still has the highest unemployment rate among the unskilled in the western world. The labour market is increasingly segmented into core and periphery. Underemployment has emerged and women with children work very few hours compared to mothers in other countries. The Hartz-IV reforms have thereby introduced a form of negative income tax (or in-work benefits) in which low paid employment is topped up by benefits. In absence of a statutory minimum wage, these forms of combined income further drive down wages already at the bottom end of the labour market. 7
5. The effects of dualization and the challenge of the service economy So far, I have argued that firms reacted to economic shocks by fostering cooperation and off-shoring non-core parts of the production either abroad or by subcontracting to cheaper service suppliers. Government policy has liberalized employment legislation and social policy for non-core workers.
Liberalization and coordination can therefore go hand in hand, leading to a segmented and dualist political economy. In this section, I will argue that dualism between different segments of the economy is also complementary and mutually dependent. In other words, Germany's competitiveness in manufacturing sectors does not only depend on collaboration with works councils at the plant-level but also on liberalization of the service economy.
Moreover, the same institutional set up which protects exporting industries helps to liberalize the service sector.
7 About 57% of Western and 41% of East German employees are covered by collective agreements which contain a minimum wage. For those not covered by collective agreements, minimum wages exist for specific sectors such as construction and cleaning via the extension of sectoral collective agreements. In other sectors (in particular postal services) the extension of collective agreements has been legally challenged. A minimum wage for temping agencies was introduced in May 2011.
The development of wages in the service economy is one example of how dualization feeds directly into the cost cutting of manufacturing firms. In contrast to other European countries, manufacturing cost cutting in Germany was helped rather than counteracted by service sector pay setting. In many other countries of the Eurozone, pay restraint was achieved in the exposed sectors, but not in the sheltered sectors. Therefore, pay rises in services outstripped the manufacturing sectors. In Germany and Austria, cost cutting in manufacturing was accompanied by an even fiercer cost cutting in services (Johnston, 2009) Three more reasons can account for weak service sector pay. First, in the wake of reunification, collective agreements were hastily transferred to the Eastern states. In manufacturing, trade unions ensured that wage levels were at an appropriate level, compared with the West. In many services sectors where unionization was weak, unions settled for very low wages in order to reach an agreement, since many employers were rather reluctant to enter collective bargaining. They thereby established a low wage floor for service sector pay.
Second, the absence of a national minimum wage, which prevents wages from falling to incredibly low levels, has contributed to a downward wage drift.
Third, a range of subsidies for low wages encouraged service sector workers to accept low wages in exchange for additional transfers. Activation policies, intended to increase labour market participation, came at the price of low wages concentrated in services.
As a consequence, manufacturing and low skilled service sector firms now work under different institutional regimes. Manufacturing is organized around a body of skilled high productivity core workers which is protected against economic insecurity. Low skilled services operate under conditions that are similar to labour markets in liberal market economies. 8
The capacity of service sector unions, primarily Verdi, to protect and raise wages by campaigning for a national minimum wage, for instance, is thus severely limited by the opposition of manufacturing unions. The same is true for limits on wage subsidies and the creation of social security exemptions for low skilled jobs. Both are accepted and even encouraged by manufacturing unions, whose members benefit from low cost services. Since then, the German economy has seen an extraordinary development. It had the steepest decline, followed by the fastest recovery, among all OECD countries (Graph 3). The effects have been most dramatic in the manufacturing sector, given the extreme dependency on the export of manufactured goods.
Source: OECD.
The recovery has been helped by the contribution of the German welfare system's automatic stabilizers and the two stimulus packages, November 5, 2008 in the amount of 11.8 billion Euro and on January 27, 2009 of approximately 50 billion Euro. In total, the German contribution to global demand stood slightly above the OECD average (Hassel and Lütz, 2010) . Of these, the German equivalent of the 'Cash for Clunkers' programme (amounting to 5 billion Euros) subsidized car manufacturers worldwide. In particular, the cash for clunkers programme protected core skilled workers in export oriented industries.
At the same time, the labour market was relatively protected from the slump's fall-out. The elasticity of employment relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) was the second lowest among the EU (European Commission, 2010), meaning the GDP loss did not translate into job losses. As a result, Germany was the only major country which emerged from the crisis with lower unemployment levels than before the crisis (Graph 4).
Source: OECD; note: 2010 refers to Q3.
As the OECD points out, the single most important explanation for the gap between the business slump and employment outcomes is the reduction of working hours (Lehndorff, 2010; OECD, 2010) . Manufacturing firms hoarded their permanent staff by employing various measures: they cut back on overtime, used deposits on working-time accounts, reduced working-time and used the public short-time provisions, which were extended as part of the stimulus package. In total, these measures were used by about a fifth of all firms. According to a plant-level survey by WSI, 30 percent of all firms used working time accounts in order to avoid dismissals. This was by far the most important adjustment mechanism. Other mechanisms were job rotation (14 percent), extra holidays (13 percent) and pay cuts (11 percent In the midst of the financial crisis, the German economy reported a remarkable recovery of the competitive position of German firms, higher than average growth and the highest employment levels ever (Möller, 2010) . We can therefore recognize the two components which contributed to this remarkable development: first, German firms used flexible adjustment tools which they had developed over the two decades since the post-unification crisis. Second, public policy, particularly the specific measure of short term working, contributed to employment stabilization during the crisis.
However, analysis of the recovery only briefly mentions the extent to which wage subsidies for the low skilled, the lack of a minimum wage and wage decline in the service sector have served as a cost containing environment, allowing export-oriented firms to contain their wages and unit labour costs.
The increasingly dualist nature of the German economy has created an export-oriented high skill industry which depends on a domestic environment of low cost services to control labour costs. This model, which is questionable in its social and economic long-run effects, is specific to the interactions of wage bargaining institutions, social and employment policies and training institutions.
Conclusion
Maintaining and regaining competitiveness for manufacturing firms has been a driving force in restructuring the German political economy. Firms have On the whole, the business community has not pressed for wholesale deregulation of labour market regulation as the power resource approach would expect. At the same time, some segments of the business community, representing the core of manufacturing industries, pursued strategies to regain competitiveness at the local level. Management allied with core workers in its quest for productivity increases. Policy changes accommodated these strategies and enabled cost containment in the service sector.
The preceding interpretation of the German case as an emerging dualism of coordination and liberalization based on producer coalition preferences implies that this development might be a typical if not stable pattern of adjustment of a coordinated market economy to a series of economic shocks.
It therefore allows a more nuanced perspective on institutional change in advanced political economies and provides a fruitful starting point for further analysis.
